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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents a computer based model of the Ontario university system. The em-
phasis is on funding, faculty staffing and faculty salaries from 1955 to 1995. Recent events 
in these areas are analyzed and explained as consequences of interaction between a strong-
ly self-equilibrating social system, the universities, and a massively disequilibrating external 
force, the expansionary drive of the 1960's. Many past and present characteristics of the 
university system are seen as temporary abberations, a return to which is not possible. The 
effects of several proposed modifications to funding, staffing and salaries policies are ex-
plored, as are prerequisites for a return to "steady state ". While a technical appendix is 
available which specifies and discusses the equations employed in the computer model, 
this paper is intended for a non-technical readership whose primary interest is the subject 
matter dealt with. 
RESUME 
Un modèle informatique du système universitaire de l'Ontario 
Cet article présente un modèle informatique du système universitaire de l'Ontario. Les 
principales composantes en sont le financement, la composition du corps professoral et 
leurs échelles de traitement de 1955 à 1995. Les développements récents dans ces domains 
sont analysés et perçus comme les effets résultant du choc de l'essor expansionniste des 
années 60, source externe de déséquilibres massifs, sur le système universitaire, corps social 
ayant une forte tendance à s'équilibrer. Certaines caractéristiques, présentes et passées, des 
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was formerly a member of the University of Toronto's central administration. The views expressed are 
the author's and not necessarily those of any other persons or organizations. The author acknowledges 
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universités sont alors considérées comme des anomalies temporaires qu 'il est impossible de 
voir se reproduire. Les conséquences de certains changements proposés dans les politiques 
sur le financement, la dotation en personnel et les salaires sont examinées de même que les 
conditions préalables à un retour à la normale. Les équations utilisées dans ce modèle sont 
reproduites et commentées dans une annexe technique reportée à la fin afin de rendre ac-
cessible cet article au lecteur non-spécialisé dont l'intérêt se situe rait au niveau du sujet 
traité. 
Introduction 
The major purpose of this paper is to explain the reasons why certain aspects of the Ontario 
university system have shown undersirable behaviour characteristics in recent years and to 
explore the implications which this explanation has for the behaviour of these aspects of 
the system in the future. A secondary purpose is to examine the potency of a number of 
policy options which might be expected to have some influence on that future . The aspects 
of system behaviour which will be discussed are the operating funding level (Provincial 
grants plus student fees), and the size, the age composition and salary levels of the full-time 
professoriat. The paper will discuss these matters at the level of aggregation of the whole 
Provincial university system, and over a period of interest of forty years. 
The discussion will have implications for other aspects of system behaviour, for condi-
tions at lower levels of aggregation, and for options available over shorter periods of time. 
Such implications lie beyond the scope of the present paper, however. This work is directed 
primarily to persons who are concerned with the longer term development of financing and 
faculty staffing aspects of the system as a whole, and secondarily to those who wish to 
draw inferences therefrom. 
The recent history of the Ontario university system is one of rapid growth in capacity 
and funding level during the sixties, followed by a leveling off in both in the first half of 
the present decade. The expansion was carried out with surprising ease, while leveling off 
has caused great difficulties. 
At present the university system's constant dollar operating funding level is increasing 
at a low rate. Expansion of the size of the full-time professoriat has not slowed propor-
tionately. A result has been increased expenditure for faculty salaries in aggregate resulting 
in downwards pressure on individual faculty salary levels and on expenditure categories 
other than faculty salaries. Because large numbers of younger faculty were hired over a 
relatively short period of time, the sixties, the age composition of the professoriat is skewed. 
As the younger faculty bulge ages it has age-related salary expectations which put further 
downward pressure on other expenditure categories. Concurrently, leveling off in total 
faculty numbers has much reduced the inflow of junior faculty, precluding any modifica-
tion of the skewed age pattern through additional hirings. 
Examination of recent trends over the past two or three years in the areas of interest 
displays a situation which may be summarized as follows: 
constant dollar operating funds 
numbers of full-time faculty 
— slow growth 
— moderate growth 
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rate of younger faculty hirings 
numbers of older faculty 
constant dollar average faculty salary 
constant dollar total full-time faculty salary expense 
non salary accounts 
— rapid decline 
— rapid growth 
— slow decline 
— slow growth 
— slow erosion 
These trends cause unhappiness to a number of actors in the university system. Govern-
ments worry about costs. Faculty worry about academic stagnation as well as declining 
real personal incomes. University administrators worry about making ends meet and coping 
with irreconcilable internal pressures. Everyone worries about a now restricted capacity to 
innovate. 
Because funding and salary policies and hiring practices have in the past been core de-
terminates of the future shape of the university system it is in terms of changes in these 
policies and practices that solutions to current and expected problems are sought. 
This paper will discuss reasons for past and future behaviour of staffing and funding 
aspects of the university system and will analyze the effect of a number of proposed solu-
tions to perceived problems. A useful discussion should convey an explicit recognition of 
underlying assumptions, it should define crisply the boundaries of the system under study, 
and it should be precise. Consequently a computer model has been chosen as the explora-
tory medium. While the human mind, unaided, is well able to observe forces and relation-
ships in the university system and to comprehend key structural aspects of this complex 
system it is limited in the number of factors it is able to consider simultaneously and is 
even more limited in its ability to trace their dynamic interaction over time. A computer 
based simulation model can help compensate for these limitations. It is a valuable tool for 
exploring complex system behavior, both past and future. The present model adds to the 
human strengths of observation and comprehension of complex structures, the capacity 
to consider large numbers of factor relationships interacting over time. 
As a theory, a computer model forces a precise specification of underlying assumptions 
and provides a precise specification of their implications. 
The complete text of the computer model used is available as an appendix to this paper, 
and is accompanied by a detailed discussion of the logic employed. While the model re-
mains a theory about reality, it is an explicit theory and it encourages scrutiny and discus-
sion. 
Summary Description of the Model 
Many social systems are self equilibrating in the sense that there exists some sort of equili-
brium state of affairs, moving or static, which they seek to approach over time if they are 
left free from external shocks. This is true of the Ontario university system as a whole and 
of three of its sub-systems whose goal equilibriums are: (1) the achievement of a faculty 
complement size consistent with available funds, (2) the achievement of faculty salary 
levels consistent with available funds, and (3) the stabilization of the faculty age mix with-
in available funds. 
The dynamics of the three inherently self stabilizing sub-systems may be most easily 
summarized through the relatively simple causal flow diagrams outlined below. 
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In the causal flow diagrams which are used it is important to note that an arrow indicates 
a causal relationship between two variables, ceteris paribus conditions always obtaining. If 
the sign of an arrow is positive, it indicates that a change in the variable from which it comes 
will cause a change in the same direction in the variable to which it leads relative to the 
second variable's prior value. If the sign of an arrow is negative the direction of change in 
the second variable will be in the opposite direction. If the number of negative signs against 
the arrows in the simple feedback loop is odd, as it is in Figure 1, that loop will be self-
equilibrating because an exogenous change in any one variable will set off a chain of events 
in the feedback loop which will eventually result in pressure on that variable in an opposite 
direction. 
Figure 1 
Faculty Complement Size and Available Funding 
Figure 1 shows the relationships involved in the university system's faculty complement 
size and available funding sub-system. Any exogenous change in Uncommitted Salary Funds, 
resulting from, say, an increase in the salaries budget, will result in a change in the same 
direction in New Position Creation. In other words an increase will cause an increase and 
a decrease will cause a decrease. The resulting change in New Position Creation will cause 
a change in the same direction in the number of Total Faculty, and this will cause a change 
in the same direction in Faculty Salary Expense. Now the amount of Uncommitted Salary 
Funds available after these interactions will be reduced by an increase in Salary Expense 
and increased by a decrease. This is indicated by the negative sign of the arrow connecting 
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these two variables. Consequently there is a sequence of events which causes an increase 
in Uncommitted Salary Funds to result later in a decrease in them. Such a system is, then, 
seen to be self-equilibrating. 
It is not intended to bore the reader with a complicated description of simple events, 
but to provide a methodology for understanding them. A series of such simple causal re-
lationships is aggregated together to provide a representation of the entire model, and a 
methodology is then necessary to understand it because it is more complex. Further, the 
aggregated representation of the entire model is the framework for the full computer-based 
representation of the system. 
Figure 2 displays the relationships involved between the university system's Faculty 
Salary Levels and its Uncommitted Salary Funds. An exogenous increase in Uncommitted 
Salary Funds causes and permits Annual Faculty Salary Increases which result in a higher 
Average Faculty Salary with the eventual result of a reduction in Uncommitted Salary 
Funds. A decrease in Uncommitted Salary Funds would similarly be dampened through 
these causalities over time. 
Figure 3 displays a long run self-equilibrating sub-system which is currently a matter of 
considerable concern within the university system, namely stabilization of faculty age mix 
within available funding. Here an exogenous increase in Uncommitted Salary Funds results 
in an increase in New Position Creation. Most new positions are filled by younger faculty so 
the per cent Junior Faculty within the system increases. These faculty, with the passage of 
the years age, and the per cent Older Faculty then increases. As faculty age they are paid 
more and so the Average Faculty Salary increases, increasing the Faculty Salary Expense 
and reducing the availability of Uncommitted Salary Funds. The effect is a long term one 
covering many years. 
Younger faculty hired during the sixties will age during the period they are on staff and 
this aging may continue until the turn of the century at which point they will retire. The 
magnitude of new position creation in Ontario during the sixties makes this feedback loop 
an important one despite the fact that its effects will only gradually be felt within the sys-
tem. 
A further factor stabilizing the faculty age mix may be described. Faculty age mix with-
in the total complement is at equilibrium when the number of senior faculty at each rele-
vant age is equal and the number of junior faculty is sufficient to maintain this equality 
given the numbers of junior faculty who are retained within the university system to be-
come senior faculty. A relatively constant retention rate will tend to damp any skewing in 
the faculty age mix over time. As a skewed age mix retires it is replaced by junior faculty 
hired at a correspondingly skewed rate. Then, if for example the junior faculty retention 
rate is 70 per cent, only 70 per cent of that skewedness will immediately repenetrate the 
older faculty age group. The other 30 per cent will be "recycled" through replacement of 
junior faculty leavings by new junior staff. The damping of age skewing by this mechanism 
will be slow however as the cycling of junior faculty leavings takes five years and the cycling 
of a skewed senior faculty age mix takes about thirty years on the assumption of a junior 
faculty leaving decision after five years, entrance into the senior faculty group at age 35 
and retirement at age 65. Each cycle removes only a portion of the skewing. Nevertheless 
the damping is sustained and the system's approach to an equilibrium age mix is a powerful 
reality. 
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Because this paper treats the Provincial university system at a very high level of aggre-
gation over a long period of time and is dealing directly with only funding, faculty staffing 
and faculty salary matters the model used adopts the system's operating funding level as 
its sole exogenous input. Factors such as student demand, social desire for educational 
activity, provincial ability to afford university expansion, creation of new universities, and 
the host of other factors external to this paper's explicit concerns are reflected in and sub-
sumed by the operating funding level. It is composed of Provincial operating grants and 
students' fees. Figure 4 illustrates the major direct impacts of Funding Level in the univer-
sity system. 









Direct Impact of Funding Level 
The most interesting aspect of social systems' behaviour is often not the equilibrium 
state itself, which seldom exists in its pure form, but the effects on system behaviour of 
disequilibrating external forces and the ways in which the system and its sub-systems at-
tempt to re-establish equilibrium during and after such shocks. The Ontario university 
system has received disequilibrating shocks from one major source in the past twenty years. 
This is the drive for rapid expansion which manifested itself in large increases in the fund-
ing of the system and was facilitated by the system's willingness to accept such increases 
for expansionary purposes. 
Faced with increases in its Funding Level the university system responds by increasing 
its Salary Budget, among other things. When fractional increases in Funding Level are 
moderate then fractional increases in Salary Budget will be directly related to them. In 
other words all of the operating funding given to the system each year is spent and the 
system desires stability in the proportion of the funding level assigned to the Salary Bud-
get. It cannot always maintain such stability. In times of rapid growth scarce faculty are 
difficult to obtain and are competed for by increases in non-faculty salary expenses which 
are more than proportionate to increases in the funding level. Such expenses provide better 
laboratories, libraries, technical and secretarial staff and the like. As a result fractional in-
creases in Salary Budget are a declining rather than a direct function of fractional increases 
in Funding Level when the latter are high. Any increases in the Salary Budget result in 
immediate increases in the Uncommitted Salary Funds. It is through this route that the 
massive funding level increases of the sixties disturbed the self-equilibrating sub-systems 
described earlier and wrenched their goal equilibrium states. 
In addition to external forces of disequilibrium the university system contains an im-
portant destabilizing feedback loop within itself. 
Figure 5 displays the effect of new position creation. An increase in Uncommitted Salary 
Funds will cause an increase in New Position Creation resulting in an increase in the per 
cent Younger Faculty on staff. Most new positions are filled by younger faculty. Since 
younger faculty are paid less than older faculty a higher per cent Younger Faculty causes 
a decline in Average Faculty Salary. This causes a reduction in Faculty Salary Expense 
which increases the Uncommitted Salary Funds. Thus expansion begets itself. Ceteris pari-
bus conditions obtain of course in this discussion. Obviously the reduction in salary expense 
effected by lowering average salaries by hiring younger faculty will be swamped by the in-
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Figure 5 
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Figure 6 
Faculty Salary Policy (Excluding Age-Related Salary Increases) 
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crease in salary expense resulting from increase in faculty numbers. It may also be disguised 
by across-the-board salary increases. Nevertheless the effect described has been present in 
the Ontario university system and it is precisely because it has been swamped and disguised 
that it has not been recognized. Now that the younger faculty previously hired have become 
older and a contrary effect is taking place it has become evident enough. 
There is another aspect of salary policy apart from the age-related nature of faculty 
salary levels. This is the across-the-board increases that take place with the passage of time. 
These two aspects are treated quite separately in the model. The relationships governing 
the latter are relatively simple. 
Given ample Funding Level increases, as obtained until the early 1970's, the university 
system tends to desire across-the-board faculty salary increases of 3.5 per cent a year in 
constant dollars. It awarded its faculty such increases until the early 1970's. Given Fund-
ing Level increases below 3.5 per cent the system will desire to pass on equivalent across-
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Simplified Causal Flow Diagram of the Model 
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the New Position Creation that can be afforded. This is simply because the greater the New 
Position Creation the less the actual Annual Faculty Salary Increases will be. These relation-
ships are outlined in Figure 6. 
All of the causalities discussed above may be aggregated together and presented in one 
simplified causal flow diagram of the model, Figure 7. 
The variable Fraction of Funding Level Spent on Faculty Salary Expense is a useful in-
dicator of events. It is self-explanatory and is calculated straightforwardly f rom the two 
variables on which it depends. 
The reader is asked to satisfy himself that the causalities portrayed are reasonably clear. 
The quantification involved is not included in this diagram nor are the delays which obtain 
between changes in variables and the effects which these changes produce in other variables. 
A number of the causalities are governed by lagged functions. The reader is referred to the 
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Figure 8 
Standard Run of the Model — Highlight of Changing Faculty Age Distributions, 1950 to 2010 
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appendix for a discussion of the specification of these matters as used in the full computer 
model. 
Figure 7 permits an understanding of how the action in any goal-seeking sub-systems 
alters the goal equilibrium of other sub-systems. For example, we established previously 
that if the "faculty salary levels and available funding" sub-system (Figure 2) is not in 
equilibrium it will seek it. In so doing one of the variables which it will at tempt to move 
towards an equilibrium value in terms of that sub-system's total equilibrium is Faculty 
Salary Expense. But Faculty Salary Expense is also a component part of other equilibrium 
seeking sub-systems and their approach to their own equilibrium will be altered by the goal 
seeking behaviour of the "faculty salary levels and available funding" sub-system. Simply 
put, an endogenous change in one sub-system will exogenously affect other sub-systems. 
The mutual dependencies of the sub-systems are many and their effect on overall system 
behaviour defies analytical solution. They are too complex for the human mind to work 
out unaided. The computer model used, however, has the capacity to take these diverse 
causalities into account, and this is one of the primary reasons why it is used. 
The bulk of the remainder of this paper will be concerned with the interaction of fund-
ing, staffing and salary policies. It is appropriate to say a word now about expected fluc-
tuations in the full time faculty age mix as these are largely fixed by history. Figure 8 
highlights changes in the age mix which have occurred to the present time and displays the 
future fluctuations described by the computer model. Operation of the full model produced 
the pattern of events contained in Figure 8. If we accept the model's result that total facul-
ty will stabilize by 1980, the age components displayed in Figure 8 fall out quite simply 
from the aging of faculty now on staff, a small amount of new position creation to 1980, 
and cessation of new position creation after that time. It will be noted that the faculty 
(full-time professoriat) have been divided up into three age groups for analytical purposes. 
It is assumed that junior faculty are hired at age 30 and that 70 per cent are retained within 
the professoriat at age 35. The remainder leave the university system. Given a stable total 
faculty complement an equilibrium age mix is analytically determinable.* If a 70 per cent 
junior faculty retention rate is assumed the equilibrium age mix solves to 54 per cent aged 
45 to 65, 27 per cent aged 35 to 45, and 19 per cent junior faculty. 
The tendency of the age mix sub-system to seek equilibrium given a stable faculty com-
plement is evident in the dampening of the oscillations after 1980 in Figure 8. The age 
composition of the faculty complement over time is displayed dramatically in percentage 
terms in Figure 9. It is clear that the age composition of the faculty in the 1960's was a 
*An equilibrium faculty age mix is an age mix which, given retirements and junior faculty leavings and 
replacements, will remain unchanged over time if there are no net changes in the size of the total facul-
ty complement . The equilibrium age mix may be found by solving the following equations. 
TF = F4565 + F3545 + J F 
F 3 5 4 5 = F4565 /2 
JF = F 4 5 6 5 / ( 4 * J F R R ) 
TF - total faculty (a given) 
F4565 - faculty aged 45 to 65 
F3545 - faculty aged 35 to 45 
JF - junior faculty 
J F R R - junior faculty retent ion rate (a given) 
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Figure 9 
Percentage Distribution of Faculty by Age Group, Analysis of the Model's Standard Run 
temporary abberation (based on expansion) and is not representative of a world to which 
the university system can hope to return. It is also clear that the average age of the faculty 
complement will increase until about 1990. 
In most of the full computer model runs which follow, this pattern of faculty aging will 
be replicated. The reason is that it is determined in largest part by hiring decisions which 
have already been made, that is, by the ages of the faculty presently on staff. There are 
few policy options, as a result, which can alter this aspect of the future. 
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Figure 1 0 
S t a n d a r d R u n o f t h e M o d e l 
Analys i s o f S y s t e m Behav iour 
Standard Run of the Model (Figure 10)f 
F i g u r e 1 0 d i s p l a y s t h e m o d e l ' s s t a n d a r d r u n . T h e u n i v e r s i t y s y s t e m ' s f u n d i n g level is t h e sole 
e x o g e n o u s i n p u t . I t is h i s t o r i c a l l y b a s e d t o 1 9 7 4 a n d t h e r e a f t e r is f i x e d b y a s s u m p t i o n t o 
i n c r e a s e s t e a d i l y a t a r a t e o f S M 1 2 . 3 a y e a r . (Al l m o n e y a m o u n t s a r e e x p r e s s e d in 1 9 7 5 
f T h e horizontal scale is t ime in years. Vertical quant i ty scales are indicated at the left side of the graphs. 
Reading f rom left to right, the vertical scales apply to total faculty, funding level, average faculty salary, 
and to fraction of funding level spent on faculty salary expense. For the numerical values, T indicates 
thousands and M indicates millions. Note that while the previous two graphs covered a t ime span f rom 
1950 to 2010, the graphs which follow concentrate on the 40 year period f rom 1955 to 1995. 
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constant dollars.) The remainder of the model's behaviour is determined by the internal 
system policies and relationships discussed above. 
The general pattern of system behaviour to 1975 is that which we know: rapid growth 
in funding level and total faculty, followed by diminished growth in funding level and grad-
ual stabilization of total faculty. 
The funding level begins to grow in the 1950's, slowly at first then more rapidly until 
1971. Funding level increases are adequate to satisfy the system's desire for salary increa-
ses and still leave large sums remaining for new position creation. Over half of the new 
positions are filled by junior faculty and the size of this group rises (as was seen in Figure 
8). The other new positions are filled by faculty aged 35 to 45 and 45 to 65 and their num-
bers increase also, though in relative terms at a lesser rate than the junior faculty. In addi-
tion normal aging takes place. Growth in the total faculty group is large. At the same time 
the average faculty salary has increased, from $13,689 in 1955 to $22,548, in 1971, an 
average increase of about 3 per cent a year. This increase has been moderated by the in-
creased proportion of junior and less expensive faculty resulting f rom growth in the fifties 
and sixties. Without this moderating effect the average faculty salary in 1971 would have 
been 8 or 9 per cent higher. 
During the period from 1962 to 1967 annual funding level increases were especially 
large. The university system was then unable to expand quickly enough to permit its facul-
ty salary expense to rise in full proportion to the funding level increases. Consequently 
the index "fraction of funding level spent on faculty salary expense" dropped. 
After 1971 the constant dollar funding level increases stopped momentarily and then 
continue but at a reduced rate. These increases are a reflection of the resources which 
society is willing and able to expend on university activities. In the model we do not deal 
with the factors which underlie these causalities, for example the economy, student enrol-
ment, political processes. The increases after 1974, SM12.3 p.a., are set in the model as an 
assumption of the author and represent a simple extrapolation of funding level increases 
in the immediately prior years: alternative assumptions could be introduced, of course. 
The university system responds by beginning to stop creating new positions, with the effect 
of gradually stabilizing total faculty size. The pattern of slowed growth in numbers here is 
a result of the system's long run preference for reasonable salary increases rather than 
growth if forced to choose between the two, and its short run inability to halt immediately 
a rapid growth mode generated by years of not having to choose between the two. In the 
short run faculty salaries suffer and decline from a high average salary of $22,854 in 1971 
to a low of $22,111 in 1978 (constant 1975 dollars). After 1978 growth in numbers will 
be sufficiently contained that salary increases can begin to approach increases in the fund-
ing level. 
The index "fraction of funding level spent on faculty salary expense" is rising slowly 
from 1967 to 1970 as the system adjusts to a slightly diminished growth rate. The sharp 
funding level squeeze of the early seventies caused it to snap upwards until salary expenses 
could be reduced by temporary reductions in constant dollar compensation levels. 
Under near stable total faculty conditions we may note the fluctuations in the age mix 
which occur. These were discussed previously. A word is in order here about the degree to 
which age skewing has and may continue to affect salary costs. Our conclusion is that it 
has had some importance but will be a lesser problem in the future. The following table 
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Table 1 
Effects of Faculty Age Skewing on Average Salaries 
and Change in Salaries Expense 
Year Average Faculty Average Faculty Salary if 
Salary ($ 1975) Equilibrium Age Mix Had 
Obtained ($ 1975) 
Average Fractional 
Annual Increase in 
Faculty Salaries 
Expense Due to Age 
Skewing 
1960 15600 16677 
1965 18481 19800 
1970 21711 23603 
1975 21928 22881 
1980 22667 22864 
1985 24635 24344 








1995 28603 28283 
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displays the relevant data drawn from the computer model. We note that age skewing will 
increase salaries expense 7 per cent between 1975 to 1990. 
The resiliency of the university system, its capacity for self-equilibration, and the absence 
of observable catastrophies in the future is striking. This is a very different fu ture than the 
one predicted by simple extrapolation of trends observed in the recent past. That future 
would be one of slow growth in funding level, continued expansion of the total faculty 
complement, erosion of other accounts to pay the salaries bill, declining real faculty in-
come, costly aging of faculty, bleak employment prospects for would-be professors. Clearly, 
when the internal dynamics of the university system are taken into account the dangers of 
disaggregated trend extrapolation become apparent. The university system as we have model-
ed it is not terribly large and complex, but it is a little too large and complex for random 
enquiry. 
A number of alternatives to present funding and staffing policies have been proposed by 
some. During the following computer runs we shall take several alternative actions and assess 
their results on behaviour. We shall assume that no significant policy revisions have been 
introduced to date and shall direct our attention to the period after 1975. The policy tests 
to be undertaken are: 
(i) freeze funding level after mid-1975 
(ii) double funding level increases to SM24.6 p.a. after mid-1975 
(iii) reduce funding level SM12.3 p.a. after mid-1975 
(iv) discontinue annual salary increases after mid-1975 
(v) target annual salary increases of 3.5 per cent p.a. after mid-1975 
(vi) freeze total faculty complement after mid-1975 
(vii) replace only 50 per cent of faculty leavings and retirements and target 3.5 per 
cent p.a. salary increases after mid-1975. 
Effect of Freezing Funding Level after Mid-1975 (Figure 11) 
We wish to test the effect on system behaviour of alternate assumptions regarding the 
future funding level. In Figure 11 we freeze the funding level after mid-1975. Growth in 
total faculty remains about the same as in the standard run. Total faculty numbers are, in 
fact, very slightly larger due to the initial element of indecision and uncertainty which the 
freeze introduces to the system. The major effect is that salaries do not begin to rise again 
after 1978 as they did in the standard run, and the tail end of the growth mode is paid for 
by depressed salaries and a moderate increase in the fraction of funding level spent on total 
faculty salary expense. 
We also conducted a computer run which doubled the standard run's assumed funding 
level increases after mid-1975 (not illustrated). Little effect on growth or the fraction of 
funding level spent on faculty salary expense resulted, but faculty salaries rose considerably. 
We conclude that within the range of funding level increases between nothing and SM24.6 
p.a. the dynamics of system behaviour render growth in total faculty numbers relatively 
insensitive to the funding level. Faculty salary increases, on the other hand, are seen to be 
quite sensitive to funding level increases within this range. The reason is, simply put, that 
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t i a t u f l 
Figure 11 
Effect of Freezing Funding Level After Mid-1975 
the system would prefer reasonable salary increases to continued expansion and that within 
the range of funding level increases tested it cannot afford both. This fact combines with 
the system's inability to stop residual expansion during the seventies and produces the ob-
served results. 
We also conducted a computer run in which the funding level after mid-1975 was re-
duced by the same amount that it was increased in the standard run, $M12.3 p.a., (also 
not illustrated) and found that such a large reduction in funding level could not be accom-
modated without forced reductions in the total faculty complement. 
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Effect of Discontinuing Annual Faculty Salary Increases After Mid-1975 
Effect of Discontinuing Annual Salary Increases after Mid-1975 (Figure 12) 
For the next computer runs we return to our assumption of a funding level which rises 
SM12.3 p.a. after 1975. We now wish to test the effect of a policy to discontinue annual 
faculty salary increases after mid-1975. As may be seen in Figure 12 the savings made are 
diverted into continuing expansion of the total faculty complement. Resultant changes in 
the age mix will delay return to an equilibrium composition as a consequence. The result 
of an exogenous discontinuance of annual faculty salary increases has been, in effect, to 
remove the major factor within the system which competes with expansion of complement 
for limited increases in resources. The effect of this policy can be seen to be highly desta-
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Figure 13 
Effect of Replacing Only 50% of Faculty Leavings and Retirements and 
Targeting a 3.5% p.a. Faculty Salary Increase After Mid-1975 
bilizing. If stabilization is desired in both salaries and complement size adjustment of the 
funding level would be the more effective policy implement. 
Effect of a Target Annual Salary Increase of 3.5 per cent p.a. 
after Mid-1975, (not illustrated) 
A policy to set an arbitrary target salary increase rate of 3.5 per cent after mid-1975, on 
that other hand, does result in a slightly earlier containment of the growth in total faculty 
numbers through diversion of funds away from expansion, but the salary increases which 
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result can only be accomplished through raising the fraction of funding level spent on facul-
ty salary expense to an unacceptable level. 
Effect of Freezing Total Faculty Complement 
after Mid-1975 (not illustrated) 
A decision to freeze the total faculty complement after mid-1975 produces results of little 
interest as the total complement is well on its way to stability by that point in any case. 
The reduction of complement size effected by 1990 is about 5 per cent and the funds thus 
freed may be used for other purposes. 
Effect of Replacing Only 50 per cent of Faculty Leavings and Retirements and Targeting 
3.5 per cent p.a. Faculty Salary Increases After Mid-1975 (Figure 13) 
In prior policy tests a constraint has existed that reductions in the total faculty complement 
not take place. We now introduce a policy to reduce the complement to its 1970 level by 
1995 through attrition and to divert the monies thus saved to faculty salary increases and 
to other purposes. The computer run indicates that such a policy would be able to produce 
its intended effects, but also would result in a faculty complement very heavily dominated 
by older professors and drawing very few younger persons. In 1985, for example, junior 
faculty would comprise only 7.6 per cent of the total, as compared with 15 per cent in the 
model's Standard Run. As a standard for comparison junior faculty comprised 33 per cent 
of the total in 1970. 
Conclusion 
This paper has presented a view of the history of funding, faculty staffing and faculty sala-
ries in the Ontario university system; a discussion of the internal dynamics of the system 
which determine its behaviour; an outline of the future system behaviour generated by 
these dynamics; and a testing of the efficacy of various policy modifications to alter that 
behaviour. 
A snapshot picture of the results of the computer runs at 1990 is presented in Table 2. 
Model tests indicate that faculty salary levels are quite sensitive to changes in the fund-
ing level within a moderate range of such changes, but that faculty complement size is not. 
Faculty salary increases are seen as competitors with complement expansion for funding 
level increases in so far as interventions which halt the former will fuel the latter. Interven-
tions to halt growth in complement size are seen as of questionable value as the comple-
ment size is well on its way to stability through existing pressures. Enforced reductions 
in complement size through attrition can be effected, but only at the cost of further bias-
ing an already skewed faculty age mix. 
In evaluating the funding and staffing policy alternatives dealt with in this paper we see 
that certain trade-offs may be made. Hopefully use of the model will have served to clarify 
some of these and the relative magnitudes involved so as to shed a little more light on the 
future implications of action being contemplated now. 
Nevertheless, our major conclusion is that the Ontario university system is strongly self-
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Table 2 
State Variables in 1990 
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Standard Run — Increase 
Funding Level SM 12.3 p.a. 792 .35 10457 16 25 59 26694 
after m i d - 1 9 7 5 
Freeze Funding Level after 
mid-1975 
615 .37 10614 16 25 59 21259 
Increase Funding Level 
$M 24.6 p.a. after mid-1975 
969 .34 10451 16 25 59 32015 
Reduce Funding Level 
$M 12.3 p.a. after mid-1975 
438 .40 10065 16 24 60 17214 
Discontinue Annual Salary 
Increases after mid-1975 
792 .36 12735 19 28 54 22483 
Target Annual Salary Increase 
at 3.5% p.a. after mid-1975 
792 .39 10084 16 24 60 30638 
Freeze Faculty Complement ^ J 3 9 8 1 3 1 6 2 4 6 Q ^ 
Target 3.5% p.a. Salary 
Increases and Replace only 
50% of Faculty Leavings 
after mid-1975 
792 .32 8007 09 20 72 31991 
1975 All Runs 608 .35 9683 24 40 36 21928 
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equilibrating along the dimensions of it which we have examined, and that reasonableness 
in the funding level provided to it is the major prerequisite for a return to an equilibrium 
state of affairs. Given the system's own tendency towards equilibrium, direct interventions 
in its internal policies may be of limited usefullness and risk being disruptive. Further, we 
conclude that the faculty salary practices, the youthfulness of the professoriat, and the 
generous funding of non-faculty salary expenses which occurred during the 1960's were 
an inevitably transitory phenomenon, made possible only by an unsustainable growth rate, 
and are not representative of a world to which the university system can hope to return. 
Three appendices ("Description of Model Equations," "Specifications for Computer Model 
Runs, "and "Sample Computer-plot Output - Standard Run of the Model") have been 
prepared by the author. Copies of these appendices are available from the Editors. 
